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of  import  compression  on  real  wages  and  underemployment,  while  in 
chapter 7  I  investigate the  links  between  capital  accumulation,  inflation, 
fiscal deficits, and financial intermediation. 
Chapter 8 covers various topics relating to the evolution of the foreign debt, 
with a detailed discussion of the different debt reschedulings undertaken since 
1982 and  institutional aspects of  the debt management  process.  The final 
chapter briefly examines the economy’s future prospects and summarizes the 
main policy implications of  the study. 
2  The Record of 
Stabilizing Development 
After the devaluation of  the peso in  1954, the Mexican economy entered a 
phase of high growth and low inflation that would last until the end of  the 
sixties. This period has  since come to be  known as the era of  Stabilizing 
Development (SD). Though it is difficult to pinpoint its exact starting date, 
there  is  general agreement that  the  SD period  covered at  least the  years 
1958-70;  that  is,  mainly the administrations of  Presidents Adolfo L6pez 
Mateos (1959-64)  and Gustavo Diaz Ordaz (1965-70). 
As stated by the then Minister of Finance, Antonio Ortiz Mena, the main 
objectives of  economic policy  during  SD were  to  increase private  sector 
savings and capital accumulation, maintain price stability and a fixed parity 
with  the dollar, and  increase real  wages  (Ortiz  Mena  1970). These goals 
were largely achieved (tables 2. la and 2. lb), leading observers to speak of a 
“Mexican  miracle.”  The exchange rate  was kept  fixed  at  12.5 pesos per 
dollar, and the annual inflation rate averaged 3.8 percent. Real output grew 
at an average rate of 6.7 percent, and the share of  gross fixed investment in 
GDP rose  (at  1960 prices) from  16.2 to 20.8 percent.  The real  industrial 
sector wage inclusive of  fringe benefits grew at an annual average rate of 
roughly 4 percent.  Workers in  the urban  informal and agricultural sectors 
also appear to have experienced large real wage gains. (The data bearing on 
real wages in the latter two sectors will be discussed in section 2.3.2.) 
In the next two sections I discuss in detail the macroeconomic, trade, and 
industrial policies that constituted the SD program.’ Section 2.3 is a critical 
examination of  the conventional view that the SD strategy was responsible 
for a severe worsening in  underemployment and the distribution of  income 
and that by  1970 it could no longer deliver sustainable, high rates of growth. Table 2.la  Macroeconomic  Aggregates (% change)" 
1958  1959  1960  1961  1962  1963  1964  1965  1966  1967  1968  1969  1970 
~~~  ~ 
Real GDP  5.3  3.0  8.1  4.9  4.7  8.0  11.7  6.5  6.9  6.3  8.1  6.3  6.9 
Manufacturing  5.4  9.0  8.5  5.6  4.9  9.2  17.5  10.0  9.6  7.1  10.5  8.4  8.7 
Agriculture, forestry, 
Inflationb  .5  3.7  5.0  3.4  2.9  3.2  5.9  2.2  4.0  2.8  2.4  4.0  4.8 
Gross fixed capital 
formation  -5.9  1.3  14.9  .8  5.4  11.5  21.8  6.0  8.9  13.7  9.6  7.4  8.3 
Real exchange rate'  108.7  104.8  100.0  94.7  92.2  89.1  84.7  84.2  83.6  82.3  82.6  82.0  81.6 
and fisheries  6.9  -3.1  5.2  1.9  3.8  5.2  7.5  5.4  1.7  2.7  3.1  1.1  4.9 
Table 2.lb  Composition of Output (% of GDP)~ 
Private consumption  79.6  79.1  76.2  75.3  75.1  73.6  72.6  71.8  72.1  72.5  73.2  71.9  71.9 
Government consumption  6.7  6.3  6.3  6.5  7.1  7.4  7.4  7.2  7.3  7.4  7.5  7.4  7.5 
Gross fixed capital 
formation  16.2  15.9  16.9  16.3  16.4  16.9  18.5  18.4  18.7  20.0  20.3  20.5  20.8 
Change in inventories  .6  .4  2.7  3.1  2.0  3.1  3.2  4.3  3.2  2.5  1.6  1.9  3.0 
Exports  11.5  11.4  10.3  10.7  10.8  10.5  10.5  10.1  9.9  9.1  9.1  10.0  8.7 
Imports  14.7  13.2  12.6  11.8  11.5  11.6  12.1  11.8  11.3  11.4  11.8  11.7  11.9 
Sources:  All national income accounts data is from lndicodores Economicos (Bank  of Mexico). Wage data is from the  Bank of Mexico's  survey of large-scale 
manufacturing firms (Encuesta Industrial Mensun. 
"Real variables are expressed in terms of  1960 prices. 
bDecember-to-December change in the CPI. 
'Calculated  as the period average exchange rate multiplied by the ratio of the US. wholesale price index (now called the producer price index) to the Mexican GDP 
deflator. 
dOutput shares at  1960 prices. 400  Edward F.  Buffie 
2.1  Macroeconomic Policy 
Macroeconomic policy  was  geared  toward  promoting  capital  accumu- 
lation  and  industrialization  while  preserving  price  and  exchange  rate 
stability. A variety of  tax and expenditure measures were employed to raise 
the return on domestic investment. The 1955 industrial promotion law  (Ley 
de  Industrias  Nuevas  y  Necesarias)  provided  an  extensive  set  of  tax 
subsidies to  new  and  “necessary”  industries (defined to  be  industries in 
which the market share of  domestic firms was less than 80 percent). Firms 
in  such  industries received  rebates  covering 40  percent  of  the  corporate 
income tax  and  100 percent  of  stamp  and  sales  taxes  and  all  duties  on 
imported  machinery,  equipment,  and  raw  materials  (Solis  1981,  6). In 
1961  the  corporate  income  tax  was  amended  to  allow  for  accelerated 
depreciation allowances. Dividends and interest income were taxed at low, 
flat  rates  and  accumulated  to  other  income  sources  in  calculating  the 
taxable  income base.  To  promote reinvestment of  profits,  neither  capital 
gains nor retained profits were taxed after  1965. And lastly, high levels of 
evasion of  the  corporate income tax  were  tolerated.  The  statutory rate  of 
42 percent was not the effective rate for most firms. 
Public  sector  investment  in  projects  complementary  to  private  sector 
capital  and  low  prices  for  publicly  provided  inputs  also  enhanced  the 
profitability  of  private  investment.  Most  public  sector  prices,  especially 
energy prices, increased more slowly than the inflation rate. According to an 
index constructed by  Clavijo (1980), the real  price of  goods and  services 
provided by the public sector fell 12.5 percent between 1961 and 1970 (table 
2.2). 
Public investment favored the industrial sector to a greater extent than in 
earlier periods. Table 2.3 shows how the composition of public sector capital 
outlays shifted over the 1954-70  period. The share of the industrial sector in 
total  investment climbed from  35.4 percent  in  1954-58  to  40.1 percent 
during the Diaz Ordaz administration, while the shares of  agriculture and 
communications and transportation declined. In real terms (deflating by the 
GDP deflator) public sector industrial investment rose 204 percent  during 
Table 2.2  Real Prices of  Public Sector Goods and Services” 
Year  Price  Year  Price 
1961  101.7  1966  96.9 
1962  99.7  1967  95.9 
1963  98.6  1968  96.2 
1964  94.4  1969  92.9 
1965  97.1  1970  89.0 
Source:  Clavijo (1980). 
“Period average price deflated by the period CPI. 401  Mexico/Chapter 2 
Table 2.3  Composition of Public Investment 
Communications  Administration 
Period  Agriculture  lndustry  & Transportation  Social Welfare  & Defense  Total 
1954-58  13.30  35.41  33.55  15.13  2.61  100 
1959-64  10.60  37.49  24.86  24.22  2.83  100 
1965-70  10.96  40.06  21.83  25.20  1.95  I00 
1954-70  11.11  38.76  24.08  23.76  2.29  100 
Source: Estadisticas Historicas de MCxico (MCxico, D.F.:  INEGI [Instituto Nacional de Estadistica Geogrofia 
e Informatica], 1985). 
SD, with much of the increased expenditures going to expand the supply of 
electricity and oil. 
Monetary policy played an important, complementary role in  stimulating 
capital accumulation. Real interest rates on bank deposits were at positive 
levels, several points above those prevailing in the United States. The high real 
rates along with the stable exchange rate succeeded in attracting a much larger 
fraction of private sector savings into the banking system, producing what some 
have termed a “financial miracle”  (table 2.4).  Led by an enormous increase 
in the demand for interest-bearing, high-liquidity deposits-the  real growth of 
bonos Jinancieros averaged  17.5%-the  supply of  bank  funds and private 
sector credit expanded rapidly. 
While  tax,  expenditure,  and  monetary  policies  were  all  enlisted  to 
stimulate investment and accelerate the pace of  industrialization, this effort 
was combined with a commitment to prudent macroeconomic management. 
The  “rules  of  the  game”  were  well  defined  and  called  for  fiscal  and 
monetary policies to be coordinated in a fashion consistent with the goals of 
price and exchange rate stability. The growth rate of the monetary base was 
closely  monitored,  and  it  was  well  understood  that  if  the  fiscal  deficit 
exceeded the level consistent with the planned  rate of  monetary emission, 
expenditures were to be lowered until  the gap was eliminated. Institutional 
arrangements were of  crucial importance in this respect.  The Ministry of 
Finance (Secretaria de Hacienda y Credit0 Publico, or SHCP) was responsible 
for controlling both revenue collection and public expenditures. This made 
Hacienda the main economic authority; the Central Bank was in charge of 
the less important tasks of  setting interest rates and regulating the financial 
system. Reinforcing the centralization of economic power in Hacienda was 
the immense personal prestige of  Ortiz Mena, who headed the Ministry of 
Finance  from  1958  to  1970.  Even  in  periods  when  relations  with  the 
president  were  strained,  Ortiz  Mena’s  authority  in  financial  matters  was 
regarded as indisputable. 
Fiscal deficits were generally small but by  no means trivial during SD, 
ranging  from  1  to  4 percent  of  GDP  during  the  sixties.2  Deficits  of 
this magnitude, however, were not highly inflationary. The main  source of Table 2.4  Monetary Aggregates and Real Interest Rates 
1958  1959  1960  1961  1962  1963  1964  1965  1966  1967  1968  1969  1970 
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-  -  - 
8.7  6.4  2.6 
7.0  7.7  8.4 
18.8  13.3  20.1 
-  -  - 
11.2  11.5  11.1 
12.8  14.1  14.0 











































20.3  9.8 
9.9  3.9 
15.0  13.6 
13.0  12.8 
14.1  15.6 
16.3  15.1 
9.8  10.7 
11.1  11.3 
16.8  18.3 
20.8  22.3 
16.2  17.8 
27.1  30.5 
9.0  9.0 
3.1  6.8 
7.9  13.3 
6.7  4.7 
14.1  12.7 
16.0  15.4 
18.8  17.6 
13.6  13.0 
10.8  11.3 
11.0  11.0 
19.4  20.8 
23.8  26.0 
19.4  21.6 
32.4  34.6 
9.0  9.0 











































Source:  All raw financial data are from Indicudores Economicos (Bank of  Mexico). 
Notes:  M2  = Currency held by  the public + peso-  and foreign-currency-denominated demand deposits. M3  = M2  + liquid savings accounts. M4  = M3  + 
nonliquid (i.e.,  fixed-term) savings accounts. 
aReal monetary aggregates are calculated as the end-of-year balance deflated by the end-of-year CPI. 
bM4 less currency held by  the public. 
'Credit  of  the Central Bank, the development banks, and commercial banks. 
dAverage of the end- and beginning-of-year monetary aggregate relative to GDP 
'Nominal  rate less the percentage change in the end-of-year CPI. 403  Mexicotchapter 2 
funds for financing the fiscal deficit was not the printing press but  rather 
forced “loans”  extracted from the commercial banking system through the 
imposition of high reserve ratios (= 34 percent). Since bank deposits grew at 
a  rapid  pace,  this  provided  a  considerable  margin  for  noninflationary 
financing of  the fiscal deficit. In  most years, the government was able to 
extract seignorage in  excess of  1 percent of  GDP (table 2.51, even though 
inflation remained very low. 
The modest fiscal deficits and brisk growth in tax revenues supported a 
considerable increase in total public sector expenditures. Real tax revenues 
rose  at  a  pace  of  8.6  percent  per annum.  As  this  was  well  above the 
growth  rate  of  real  output,  the  share of  public  sector revenues  in  GDP 
increased by  almost two percentage points between  1960 and  1970. From 
table 2.6 it can be seen that direct taxes were the main source of  revenue 
growth. Indirect taxes grew at the sluggish rate of 4 percent per annum and 
in  1970 supplied only 57 percent of  total tax revenues, a rather low figure 
for a less developed country. The bulk of the growth in direct taxes came 
from  taxation  of  wages  and  salaries,  which  were  taxed  at  increasing 
marginal rates. 
Concern about inequities in the tax  system and  the desire to  finance a 
more ambitious public investment program led to an attempt at tax reform 
in  1964-65.  I discuss the failure of  this attempted tax reform at length not 
because it was, as is often claimed, responsible for mounting fiscal deficits 
toward the end of the SD era. Tax  revenues grew rapidly despite the failure 
to achieve tax reform and, as is shown later in  section 2.3.3,  after taking 
account of  the normal workings of  the political business cycle, there is no 
evidence  that  fiscal  discipline  deteriorated  during  the  Diaz  Ordaz 
administration.  The  failed  campaign  for  tax  reform  in  1964-65  is 
significant  instead  because  it  foreshadowed  failures  in  the  following 
Echevema,  Lopez  Portillo,  and  De  La  Madrid  administrations,  when 
expansion of  the tax  base  would be  essential for averting a loss of  fiscal 
control. 
2.1.1 
In  1963 Ortiz  Mena  invited  Nicholas  Kaldor  to  prepare  a  report  on 
restructuring the tax ~ystern.~  Kaldor proposed that the fractionalized system 
of reporting income be replaced by a global income tax. The exemption level 
The Attempt at Tax Reform in  1964-65 
Table 2.5  Seignorage (96 of  GDP) 
1961  .67  1966  1.17 
1962  1.30  1967  .84 
1963  1.73  1968  1.35 
1964  1.68  1969  1.14 
1965  .75  1970  1.12 Table 2.6  Tax  Revenue Performance 
1958  1959  1960  1961  1962  1963  1964  1965  1966  1967  1968  1969  1970 
Real growth rates" 
Total taxes  8.6  2.8  6.8  2.7  8.7  11.1  15.0  -1.4  15.5  5.6  15.5  7.4  7.5 
Direct  -4.6  5.4  13.4  7.9  12.6  12.3  25.6  -16.4  36.8  13.6  15.3  11.1  5.3 
Indirect  15.4  1.7  3.9  .2  6.6  10.4  9.1  8.3  4.9  .4  15.6  4.7  9.2 
Total taxes  7.1  7.1  7.0  6.9  7.1  7.3  7.6  7.0  7.6  7.5  8.0  8.1  8.1 
Direct  2.1  2.2  2.3  2.3  2.5  2.6  3.0  2.3  3.0  3.2  3.4  3.5  3.5 
Indirect  5.0  4.9  4.7  4.5  4.6  4.7  4.6  4.7  4.6  4.3  4.6  4.6  4.6 
in total tax revenue  30.0  30.7  32.6  34.3  35.5  35.9  39.2  33.2  39.4  42.3  42.3  43.7  42.8 
Share of GDP 
Share of  direct taxes 
Sources:  All data  for  1965-70  are  from  Esfadisticas Hacendarias  del  Sector  Publico: Cifras Anuales,  1965-1982  (SHCP). Data for  1958-64  are  from 
Estadisricas Hisroricas  de  Mhico (MCxico,  D.F.: INEGI,  1985): 632.  The  series for total  taxes  from this  source differs significantly from that  found  in 
Esradisticas Hacendarias. Our series for total taxes over  1958-64  is constructed by splicing the Esfadisticas Hacendarias series to the Esradisricas Historicas 
series using the  1965 overlap. 
"Nominal revenues deflated by  the GDP deflator. 405  MexicoJChapter 2 
was  $l,OOO,  and  the  taxable base  was  to  be  calculated by  summing all 
income regardless of  its source. Progressive rates would be applied against 
the global base, with the maximum rate being 40 percent. 
Very  modest wealth and inheritance taxes were to supplement the global 
income tax. The proposed wealth tax required full disclosure of assets and 
would  be  levied  against  both  tangible  and  nontangible  wealth  (net  of 
liabilities)  valued  at  acquisition  prices.  The  exemption  level  was  set  at 
$40,000; wealth holdings exceeding this level were to be taxed at a rate of 
0.25 percent, increasing in equal 0.25 percent intervals with each additional 
$SO,OOO  until the rate reached a ceiling of  1 percent. 
By  and  large,  the proposed tax  reform was  rejected.  A few piecemeal 
changes were  introduced (interest payments from fixed rate  securities and 
housing rents became subject to taxation), but efforts to globalize the income 
tax and institute a wealth tax foundered on two contentious issues that have 
ever since undermined attempts at substantive tax reform: 
1.  The anonymity of wealth. The wealth tax required bonds and stocks to be 
nominative  and  registered.  The  private  sector  (and  many  important 
politicians) opposed this measure, which would disclose the amount and 
possibly the origin of their wealth. 
2.  The  equal  treatment  of  property  and  labor  income.  This  was  and 
continues  to  be  the  major  obstacle  to  reaching  an  agreement on  the 
definition of  a broad tax base. 
In August 1966 Ortiz Mena (1973, 46-47)  stated publicly that tax reform 
was more a “process”  than a “radical  change”  and suggested leaving the 
date  “adequate  for  its  implementation to more  favorable circumstances.” 
After this, the drive for a major tax reform was abandoned. 
2.2  Trade and Industrial Policies 
The  manufacturing sector  was  the  engine  of  growth  during  SD.  Real 
manufacturing growth was consistently high,  averaging 9.0 percent during 
the terms of  both  L6pez Mateos and  Diaz Ordaz.  As  a  fraction of  GDP, 
manufacturing output increased from 23.3 percent in  1960 to 27.9 percent in 
1970. 
Manufacturing  growth  was  fostered  by  an  import-substituting  trade 
strategy  involving  an  escalated  structure  of  protection.  Tariff  rates  were 
5- 15 percent on raw materials and intermediate products, 20-25  percent on 
machinery and tools, 25-35  percent on other manufactured goods, and  100 
percent on automobiles (Solis 1981, 6). The tariff structure, however, may 
not accurately reflect the actual pattern and degree of protection in view of 
the fact that quantitative restrictions came into widespread use in the sixties. 
While 35.1 percent of  imports (in value terms) were subject to licenses in 406  Edward F.  Buffie 
1957, by  1970 this figure had increased to 68.3 percent (Gil Diaz  1984b, 
table A-7).  Nonetheless, most  studies concur that,  by  LDC standards, the 
trade regime was modestly prote~tionist.~ 
Besides the trade regime, public sector pricing policy, interest rates, and 
tax credits affected the structure of relative factor prices.  In  the  industrial 
sector, the user cost of capital and the real price of electricity exhibited sharp 
declines, while real raw material prices increased slightly. The real (product) 
wage,  by  contrast,  grew very  strongly after  1961, ending up  50 percent 
higher in 1970 than at the beginning of the decade. 
It  is difficult to  ascertain  how  the  mix  of  trade and  industrial policies 
affected employment growth in different sectors. There are numerous serious 
problems  with  the  employment  data  in  the  1960  and  1970 population 
censuses. The original 1960 census was marred by  gross processing errors, 
and the corrected version still appears to overenumerate greatly the size of 
the agricultural labor force. Classification schemes also differ as between the 
two  censuses,  and  in  the  1970  census  a  large  number  of  labor  force 
participants were not assigned to any category. (This was also a problem, but 
to  a lesser extent,  in the  1960 cen~us.)~  Estimates of  employment growth 
differ widely depending on the nature of  the adjustments made to “correct” 
these and other flaws in the data. 
Although the quality of  the data is problematic, the weight of the evidence 
favors  the  conclusion that,  despite  large,  sustained  increases in  the  real 
wage, employment growth in the industrial sector considerably outstripped 
the growth rate of  the labor force. Table 2.7 presents the estimates made by 
Unikel  (1978) and  Altimir  (1974) for the  sixties.  According to  Altimir’s 
Table 2.7  Employment Growth (average annual  rate) 
1950-60  1960-69 
Altimir 
Primarya  .4  .5 
Tertiary“  4.2  3.9 
Secondaryb  3.9  5.2 
Total  2.0  2.7 
1960-65  1966-70 
Unikel 
Agriculture  -1.36  -  1.92 
Industry  3.11  2.80 
Services  4.88  4.05 
Total  1.40  1.33 
Sources: Unikel (1978); and Altimir (1974), cited in  Gregory (1986, 30) 
aAgriculture, livestock, forestry, and fishing. 
bMining, petroleum, manufacturing, construction, and electric power generation 
‘Commerce,  finance, transportation, communications, government, and other services. 407  Mexico/Chapter 2 
estimates, employment growth in the high-wage industrial sector accelerated 
in the sixties and, at an annual average rate of 5.2 percent, was the highest of 
the sectoral figures. Unikel’s estimate of employment growth is much lower, 
but is still well above the growth rate of the labor force. 
2.3  Another Look at the Record of Stabilizing Development 
In the initial, quick examination in section 2.1 of the macroeconomic data 
for  1958-70,  I observed that the record of  SD with respect to growth of 
aggregate output, growth of  real  industrial sector wages, investment, and 
inflation  was  impressive.  Many  students  of  Mexican  economic  history, 
however, are of  the view that a more detailed investigation reveals that the 
SD program was inherently flawed. Conventional wisdom holds that starting 
sometime around the mid-sixties the Mexican economy was beset by  a host 





Inadequate employment growth.  Underemployment is  alleged to  have 
worsened as a result of  policies aimed at stimulating investment, which 
made  capital  relatively  cheap  and  encouraged  firms  to  use  less 
labor-intensive technologies, and  the protectionist trade regime, which 
promoted the capital-intensive, import-substituting industrial sector at the 
expense of the labor-intensive agricultural sector. 
A  worsening  distribution  of  income.’  Neglect  of  agriculture  and 
inadequate employment growth meant  that  the  poorest  groups gained 
little in the growth achieved under SD. 
Progressive  loss  of  Jiscal  control.  *  Concern  about  the  deteriorating 
distribution  of  income  created  pressure  to  increase  social  welfare 
expenditures, leading to a sharp increase in overall public sector spending 
in  the last half  of  the sixties. Due to an earlier failure to achieve any 
significant tax reform, revenue growth could not keep pace and the fiscal 
deficit started rising, climbing from 0.9 percent of  GDP in  1965 to 3.8 
percent in  1970 (tables 2.8 and 2.9). The larger fiscal deficits, in turn, 
caused the  payments  balance to  deteriorate, and  by  1970 the  current 
account deficit had reached the unprecedented figure of  $1.19 billion. 
Diminishing growth p~tential.~  It is often claimed that the economy began 
to  lose steam after  1965 when  growth  in  agricultural output declined 
steeply and the opportunities for “easy”  and efficient import-substitution 
had been largely exhausted. 
I am unable to find much support for this critique. Most of  the critique, if 
not incorrect, rests on very shaky foundations. 
2.3.1  The Distribution of  Income 
Utilizing data from various household-expenditure surveys dating back to 
1950, numerous studies have been made of  how the distribution of income 408  Edward E  Buffie 
Table 2.8  Public Sector Revenues and Expenditures (or0 of GNP) 
I965  1966  1967  1968  I969  1970 
Expenditure 
Current 





Deficit on financial intermediationb 
Monetary deficit 
18.8  18.4  19.7  19.6  20.0  22.3 
15.1  14.9  14.7  14.5  14.6  15.3 
.4  .5  .6  .7  .7  .8 
14.6  14.4  14.1  13.8  13.9  14.5 
3.7  3.5  5.0  5.  I  5.4  7.0 
18.0  17.3  17.5  17.7  18.1  18.9 
.8  1.1  2.2  1.9  1.9  3.4 
.1  .1  .2  .3  .3  .3 
.9  1.2  2.4  2.2  2.2  3.8 
Source:  Estadisticas Hacendarias del Sector Publico: Cifras Anuales,  1965- 1982 (SHCP). 
“Estimated by multiplying public sector interest payments on the foreign debt by the period average controlled 
exchange rate. 
bDeficit of  La Banca de Desarrollo 
Table 2.9  Breakdown of the Fiscal Deficit (9% of GDP) 
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Source:  Estadisticas Hacendarias del Sector Publico: Cifras Anuales, 1965- 1982  (SHCP) 
’Sum  of  revenues and taxes paid. 
bBudget- and nonbudget-controlled parastatal enterprises 
‘Includes  DDF (Department of  the Federal District). 
evolved during SD. The general conclusion reached by  these studies is that 
the distribution of income worsened significantly. Tables 2.10 and 2.11 show 
how the distribution of  income by  decile and several standard distributional 
measures  varied  from  1950 to  1977.  All  of  the  distributional  measures 
(except  possibly  Atkinson’s  Coefficient)  suggest  a  marked  increase  in 
inequality between  1958 and  1970. According to  table  2.10,  the  middle 
classes and the very rich were the main beneficiaries of growth. The income 409  Mexico/Chapter 2 
Table 2.10  Distribution of Income by Deciles 












2.43  2.32  1.69  1.21  I .42  0.69  1.08 
3.17  3.21  1.97  2.21  2.34  1.28  2.21 
3.18  4.06  3.42  3.04  3.49  2.68  3.23 
4.29  4.98  3.42  4.23  4.54  3.80  4.42 
4.93  6.02  5.14  5.07  5.46  5.25  5.73 
5.96  7.49  6.08  6.46  8.24  6.89  7.15 
7.04  8.29  7.85  8.28  8.24  8.56  9.11 
9.63  10.73  12.73  11.39  10.44  8.71  11.98 
13.89  17.20  16.45  16.06  16.61  17.12  17.09 
45.48  35.70  41.60  42.05  39.21  45.02  37.99 
100.00  100.00  100.00  100.00  100.00  100.00  100.00 
Source:  Hernandez and Cordova (1979, 443), cited in Gallardo (1983, 2240). 
"Revised data from the Bank  of  Mexico. 
share of  the  sixth,  seventh, and  top  deciles rose,  while the  share of  all 
remaining deciles fell. 
Notice,  however,  that  any  worsening  that  may  have  occurred  in  the 
distribution of income took place entirely in the very short period from 1958 
to 1963. Between 1963 and  1970, the various income distribution measures 
either remain stable or improve. The sharp reversal after 1963 raises doubts 
about how  much of  the overall deterioration in  the distribution of  income 
over 1958-70  can be attributed to the policies of  SD. gone accepts that 
there was  a strong causal link, one can say from the data either that the 
distribution of income had ceased to deteriorate by  1963 or that the initial 
deterioration caused by SD policies was temporary and after 1963 was in the 
process of  being reversed. 
The conclusion that the distribution of  income deteriorated between 1958 
and 1970 is also open to question. Apart from problems in the quality of  the 
data  across  surveys,  the  summary income  distribution measures  may  be 
biased. It is well known, for example, that when individuals change their 
position  in  the  income  distribution ranking,  the  Gini coefficient and  the 
income share of the poorest may suggest that the distribution of income has 
worsened when in fact it has unambiguously improved.  lo This would appear 
to be a potentially serious problem in the Mexican case, for, as noted earlier, 
employment growth in the industrial sector was well above the growth rate 
of the labor force during SD. The resulting substantial transfer of labor from 
low- to high-wage sectors of  the economy probably enabled many  of  the 
(formerly) poor to move up the income distribution ladder. 
The latter observation suggests one final point.  Regardless of  how  the 
overall  distribution  of  income  may  have  changed,  it  seems  the  poor 
benefitted  substantially  in  absolute terms  from  the  high  rates  of  growth 
achieved under  SD.  From the  data in  table  2.10 one can  infer  that  real 
incomes  of  the  poorest  40  percent  of  the  population  grew  at  an  annual Table 2.11  Inequality Indices 
Atkinson's Coefficient of Inequality  Richest 20%  Middle 30%  % of  poar families 
Gini  Theil  E = .5  E  = 1.5  E  = 3.0  Poorest 40%  Poorest 40%  Ab  B' 
1950  S16  .748  -  -  -  4.5  1.37  60  - 
1958  ,450  ,406  -  -  -  3.6  1.49  45  - 
1963  ,527  ,494  .20  .45  .62  5.5  1.81  35  - 
1968  ,526  ,488  .I6  .42  .62  5.4  1.85  30d  63.2 
1970  .496  ,498  -  4.7  1.86  -  48.6 
-  -  7.3  2.45  -  49.5  1975"  370  ,556  - 
1977  ,496  ,426  .I7  .44  .78  5.0  2.01 
~  ~ 
-  - 
Sources:  Measure A of the percentage of  poor families is from van Ginneken (1980,  19). Measure B is based on estimates made 
by  a World Bank mission and is from Solis (1981,  147). The estimates of Atkinson's Coefficient are from Aspe and Beristain 
(1984b,  45).  The other income distribution measures are from Gallardo (1983,  2241). 
'For  the per capita income distribution. 
bPoverty line is 10,000 pesos per year. 
+Poverty line is the 1975 minimum wage. 
dThe figure is for 1969. 
The  data in the 1975 Income-Expenditure Survey are known to be unreliable. 411  Mexico/Chapter 2 
average rate of 5.8 percent during the SD era.” According to a study by van 
Ginneken (1980), the percentage of families living in poverty declined from 
45 percent in 1958 to 30 percent in  1969.’* 
2.3.2  Underemployment 
The  claim  that  underemployment  worsened  during  SD  strikes  me  as 
particularly weak.  First,  the assertion that  decreases in real  energy prices 
and in the user cost of  capital slowed employment growth is theoretically 
dubious. Lower prices for energy and capital might  induce firms to adopt 
less labor-intensive technology, but  they  also  raise  the  profit-maximizing 
level of  output.  From production theory  and most  empirical estimates one 
can  argue that  normally the favorable output effect on  labor demand  will 
dominate the  adverse  substitution effect.  Factors  of  production,  in  other 
words, tend to be gross complements so that reductions in the cost of capital 
and energy would be expected to raise,  not lower, the rate of  employment 
growth.  Observations that  the  capital  and  energy  intensity of  production 
increased  are  beside  the  point;  it  is  precisely  the  greater  utilization  of 
cooperating,  complementary factors  that  enhances  labor  productivity  and 
expands labor demand. 
The thrust of  my  analysis so far has been that the SD policies promoted 
employment growth in the high-wage industrial sector. This is not, of course, 
sufficient to rule out the possibility that underemployment worsened during 
SD. Indeed, there is a sizable school of  thought which contends that while 
industrial sector employment growth was respectable, it was achieved at the 
cost of generally stagnant employment. Shrinking employment opportunities 
in agriculture, it is asserted, caused a large increase in migration out of rural 
areas.  Only  a  small fraction  of  the  rural  migrants could be  absorbed by 
expansion in the capital-intensive industrial sector; the remainder spilled over 
into the low-productivity informal sector. 
The  employment  data,  unfortunately,  are  inconclusive  on  this  point. 
Different stories emerge from the different methods various authors use to 
adjust  the  employment data  in  the  1960 and  1970 population  censuses. 
Referring back to table 2.7, Unikel’s estimates show aggregate employment 
growth lagging behind the growth rate of the labor force. Altimir’s estimates, 
on the other hand, show not only much greater rates of employment growth 
in  agriculture and industry but also a doubling in the growth rate of  labor 
productivity in the tertiary sector from the fifties to the sixties. 
On balance, it seems the evidence lends greater support to the view that 
the  SD  policies  succeeded  in  greatly  reducing  the  extent  of  underem- 
ployment.  Altimir’s  estimates  are  corroborated  by  a  number  of  other 
findings which  suggest that  labor  demand grew very  strongly throughout 
the sixties. Gregory (1986) reviews the data on wages and productivity in 
the  informal  sector  and  concludes  that  they  strongly  contradict  the 
hypotheses  that  (in  the  sixties):  (a)  low  wages  and  low  productivity 412  Edward F.  Buffie 
generally characterize the informal sector and  (b) the large shift of  labor 
out  of  agriculture depressed informal sector incomes. Labor productivity 
increased  strongly  in  the  service  sector,  and  in  many  branches  wages 
exceeded  the  minimum  wage  in  1970  (34-49).  Table  2.12,  which  is 
constructed from Gregory’s tables 7.4 and 7.5, shows that real wages and 
labor productivity increased substantially across all  size establishments in 
industry, commerce, and services. 
Migration studies provide additional evidence of  improving employment 
opportunities.  l3 According to anthropological studies and sample surveys of 
migrants in Mexico City and Monterrey, most migrants found employment 
very quickly and  viewed migration as having substantially improved their 
standard of  living. In addition, the studies do not  confirm the notion that 
migrants flooded into the informal sector. The share of migrants taking their 
first job in the tertiary sector declined in each succeeding decade from 1930 
Table 2.12  Average Annual Growth Rates of Total Real Remunerations and Net 
Value-Added per Employee, 1960-70s 
Average Remuneration  Net Valuc-Added 
Sector and Size of  Establishment  per Employee  per Employee 





Establishments with paid employees 
Industry,  1-5  workers 
Services,  1-2  workersb 
Commerce, 1-2  workers 
Industry,  6-25  workers 
Services,  3-8  workers‘ 
Commerce, 3-8  workers 
Industry,  26-  100 workers 
Industry,  101-500 workers 
Industry,  >500  workers 
Services,  >9 workersC 























Sources:  The growth rates of real  remunerations are calculated from Gregory (1986), table 7-3 (232). Net 
value-added per employee is calculated by deflating Gregory’s estimates of nominal value-added in table 7-5 
(240) by  a price  deflator  for  industrial  sector  value-added.  The  deflator  was  constructed  by  forming  a 
weighted average of  the price deflators for the manufacturing, construction, mining, and electricity sectors, 
where the respective weights were given by the sector’s share in  total industrial value-added in  1960. 
aTotal remunerations are wages and salaries plus fringe benefits and payroll taxes. Nominal remunerations are 
deflated by  the CPI for Mexico City. 
bl-3  workers in  1960. 
‘4-10  workers in  1960 
dl  1 or more workers in  1960. 413  Mexico/Chapter 2 
to 1970; in the sixties, 56 percent of migrant unskilled workers went into the 
industrial sector. 
2.3.3  Fiscal Discipline 
The  claim  that  fiscal  discipline began  to  break  down  during  the  Diaz 
Ordaz administration in the wake of  political unrest and pressures to increase 
social welfare expenditure does not appear to be any better founded than the 
claims that SD had adverse repercussions on the distribution of income and 
employment  growth.  The  share  of  public  investment  devoted  to  social 
welfare did increase during the Diaz Ordaz administration, but the increase 
was  far  smaller  than  in  the  preceding  L6pez  Mateos  administration. 
Moreover,  while  1965-70  was  a time of  considerable social and political 
tension, so also was the 1958-64  period. If Diaz Ordaz had to contend with 
a students’ strike in 1965 and student riots in  1968, L6pez Mateos faced the 
railroad strike and the teachers’ strike in  1959, a rural guerilla campaign in 
1962, and  a physicians’  strike in  1964 (which almost brought down  the 
government). 
If  there was no weakening of  fiscal discipline, what then accounts for the 
steady increase in the fiscal deficit from 0.9 percent in 1965 to 3.8 percent in 
1970? A  quite plausible answer is that  the growth of  the deficit reflected 
nothing  more  than  the  normal  workings  of  a  well-defined  political  ex- 
penditure cycle.  l4  Table 2.13 displays the results of regressing the detrended 
values of  current, capital, and total government expenditure for 1965-85  on 
six dummy variables (01-06)  corresponding to  the  six  years  making  up 
the  presidential  term.  Serial  correlation  was  tested  using  the  limits  for 
the Durbin-Watson statistic developed by  Farebrother (1980) for regression 
Table 2.13  The Political Expenditure Cycle 
Total Public  Current  Capital 
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equations without a constant term. In those cases where the Durbin-Watson 
value fell in the indeterminant range, Bartlett’s (1946) test was then applied 
as a second check for serial correlation. In none of the regressions was there 
evidence of  first-order serial correlation. 
It is clear from table 2.13 that fiscal policy follows a very distinct cycle. 
For total  government expenditure,  the  dummy variables are negative and 
significant in the first two years and positive and significant for the last two 
years. Capital expenditures exhibit a significant decrease in the first year and 
a  significant increase in  the fifth year,  while current expenditures show a 
nearly significant decrease in the second year and a significant increase in the 
final year. 
The expenditure cycle  seems to  stem from both  the perceived political 
advantages  of  increasing  expenditures  shortly  before  elections  and  the 
incongruity between the natural gestation period of  investment projects and 
the fixed, six-year term (sexenio) of  each administration (reelection is not 
allowed). Fiscal expansion invariably occurs in the two years preceding the 
upcoming election. Capital spending first increases strongly in the fifth year 
in the rush to complete investment projects before the term of  the existing 
administration  expires.  In  the  following  year,  spending  surges  again  as 
current expenditures rise in the campaign to strengthen political support just 
before the election. Immediately after the election, spending falls sharply as 
capital  expenditures  temporarily  decline  while  a  new  set  of  investment 
projects are being designed and the new administration strives to reduce the 
fiscal deficit. Fiscal control then prevails until the fifth year when the cycle 
starts to repeat itself. 
Returning to  the  issue of  fiscal  discipline in  the  latter part  of  the  SD 
period, since 1965 was the first year of  the Diaz Ordaz sexenio, the increase 
in the fiscal deficit between 1965 and 1970 was not at all out of the ordinary. 
The relevant comparison is  between the fiscal deficits of  1964 and  1970. 
This comparison does not support the notion of mounting fiscal problems. In 
both years, the deficit was approximately 4 percent of GDP. 
2.3.4 . Diminishing Growth Momentum? 
Finally,  I  also  disagree  with  the  claim  that  the  economy’s  growth 
momentum began to decline after the mid-sixties. Much has been made of 
the drop in the growth rate to 4.2 percent in 1971  .I5  But this drop is readily 
explained by  the  fiscal  retrenchment that  occurs  in  the  first  year  of  the 
political  expenditure cycle.  Table  2.14  confirms  the  expectation  that  the 
expenditure cycle  is  associated with  a  similar cycle  for real  GDP.I6 The 
difference between the actual growth rate in  1971 and the fitted value of  the 
model is only 0.0012 and is not statistically significant (the SEE is 0.0328). 
Thus, the 1971 slowdown was hardly unusual. 
Concerning the  pattern of  agricultural output,  the  high  rates of  growth 
between  1945 and  1965 were  based  on  the  development  of  large-scale 415  MexicoIChapter 2 
lsble 2.14  The Political Expenditure Cycle and  Real Output, 1940-85’ 
Real GDP 
DI  -  .02 
(1.85) 
02  -  .01 
(.89) 
03  -  .006 
(.57) 
04  ,015 
(1.30) 
D5  .021 
(1.75) 
06  .005 
(.W 
R2  =  .52 
R2  =  .45 
DW =  1.06 
- 
%statistics are in parentheses. 
irrigation schemes in the northwest that improved existing lands or brought 
vast amounts of  new land under cultivation. By  1965 this source of  growth 
had been largely exhausted.17 Agricultural growth fell off sharply after 1965 
because  of  political  constraints  on  land  redistribution  that  prevented 
investment to  develop the  more  populous, rainfed  agricultural areas,  not 
because  SD  entailed  “neglect”  of  the  agricultural sector.  Furthermore, 
despite the  deceleration in  agricultural growth,  overall growth  remained 
satisfactory  owing  to  the  strong  performance  of  the  industrial  sector. 
Industrial sector productivity continued to grow at an impressive rate,  the 
investment share in GDP increased 2.4 percentage points (measured at 1960 
prices), and total output growth averaged 6.8 percent during the Diaz Ordaz 
administration. 
The continuing dynamism of the industrial sector would seem to belie the 
claim that the process  of  import substitution was  encountering increasing 
difficulties. The argument that much of this growth was inefficient because it 
was achieved under a protectionist trade regime is also quite dubious. Free 
trade  is  not  necessarily  optimal if  distortions are present  and  cannot be 
remedied by  the imposition of  appropriate lump-sum taxes and  subsidies. 
Recent  theoretical  work,  in  fact,  suggests that  an  escalated structure of 
protection is  an  appropriate (second-best) policy when either the  level of 
private investment falls short of the socially desired level or the labor market 
is distorted by  wage rigidity in the industrial sector.’* Given the sizable gap 
between  wages  in  the  industrial  sector and  the  informal  and  agricultural 
sectors, the record of  sustained growth in  industrial productivity, and  the 
moderate nature of  Mexican protection, it is difficult to construct a strong 
case for the  view  that  import-substituting industrialization was  inefficient 
during SD. The one obvious flaw in the trade regime was the relatively high 416  Edward F.  Buffie 
degree of  protection granted to the domestic capital goods sector. A trade 
regime that did not  protect this sector would have been  more effective in 
stimulating economywide capital accumulation. 
2.4  Concluding Observations 
Thc SD era was one of the most successful periods of Mexican economic 
development. A remarkable degree of  macroeconomic stability prevailed at 
the same time that annual GDP growth averaged 6.7 percent. In  my  view, 
there  is  no  firm  evidence  that  the  accomplishments of  high  growth  and 
macroeconomic stability were tainted by  a worsening in either underemploy- 
ment or the distribution of  income.  In  fact,  some evidence points to  the 
opposite conclusion or, at the very least, to the conclusion that the record of 
SD was adequate on these two counts. Labor demand grew strongly in the 
high-wage industrial sector. Even Unikel's pessimistic estimates show indus- 
trial sector employment expanding at an annual clip of 3 percent despite real 
wage growth averaging over 4 percent. And while employment studies yield 
disparate conclusions about the growth of  aggregate employment, wage and 
productivity data suggest that substantial progress was achieved in reducing 
the extent of  underemployment. 
Distributional studies are plagued by problems in the comparability of data 
at different points in time and likely biases in the summary measures of  the 
income distribution. Putting these reservations aside, the data, such as they 
are,  show  that  inequality  increased  between  1958  and  1970.  But  the 
worsening in  the distribution of  income occurred entirely in  the  1958-63 
subperiod; after  1963, the  distribution of  income improved. This peculiar 
pattern,  coupled  with  the  substantial  transfer  of  labor  from  low-  to 
high-wage activities, makes one suspicious of the claim that a heightening of 
income inequality was  inherent  in  SD policies.  Furthermore,  though  the 
distribution of income may have deteriorated and SD policies may have been 
partially  to  blame,  it  also  seems that  in  absolute terms  the  poor  reaped 
substantial gains.  Average  real  income  of  the  poorest 40  percent  of  the 
population  increased 97 percent,  and  the percentage of  families living in 
poverty greatly declined.  l9 
The SD period was marred by  numerous outbreaks of  social unrest. It is 
hardly clear, however, that these outbreaks had much, if  anything, to do with 
the  economic  policies  of  SD. The  growth  of  social  discontent  reflected 
principally the dissatisfaction of  the middle classes at being excluded from 
the  political  process.  In  earlier  years,  political  hegemony  had  been 
maintained by  co-opting the growing middle class into either the government 
or party bureaucracy. By  1960 the middle class was simply too large to be 
placated in this fashion and the political consensus began to unravel.20 
Some authors (e.g. Tell0 1979) contend that the social unrest of the sixties 
can  be  traced  to  increased  underemployment  and  a  deterioration  in  the 
distribution of  income which adversely affected the welfare of  the middle 417  Mexico/Chapter 3 
classes.  But  the  claim  that  underemployment  worsened  is  difficult  to 
substantiate, and the data in the income-expenditure surveys contradict the 
notion  that  economic  factors  underlay  middle  class  dissatisfaction.  The 
income share  of  the  middle classes  increased in  each  succeeding survey 
(1958, 1963,  1968,  1970) and rose far more over the  1958-70  period than 
that of any other group. 
In  vigorously  defending the record of  SD, I am  not  saying that  policy 
mistakes were not  made.  Tax  reform,  less rapid real  wage  growth in the 
industrial sector, and greater efforts at promoting agricultural development 
would, I believe, have led to greater reductions in underemployment and a 
more equitable distribution of  income.  Overall,  however,  SD worked  and 
worked well. 
3  Shared Development and the 
Echeverria Administration 
The presidential campaign of  Luis Echevem’a  generated great enthusiasm 
and high hopes among the general population. Echevem’a  crisscrossed the 
country, exhibiting a  level of  political energy not  seen since the days of 
Lkzaro C6rdenas in the thirties. He repeatedly stressed two basic themes in 
his  campaign: prevention of  another social conflict like that of  1968 and 
preservation of  the fixed exchange rate of  12.5 pesos per dollar. The first 
objective reflected Echevem’a’s  intention to achieve a reconciliation with the 
young  and  the  middle  class.  The  second  signalled  a  commitment  to 
perpetuate the successful financial system inherited from SD. 
Although the Ministry of Finance and Bank of Mexico were placed under 
the direction of  professionals who had served the two preceding administra- 
tions, the economic program of  SD was rejected as having done too little to 
reduce  underemployment and  improve the  distribution of  income.  It  was 
announced that henceforth the government would take a more active role in 
ameliorating social ills-that  is, in promoting “Shared Development.” The 
initial economic program proposed six measures to foster Shared Develop- 
ment and reduce the large current account deficit of  1970:’ 
1. Increase  the  supply  of  credit  to,  and  government  investment  in,  the 
2.  Replace licenses by  tariffs, eliminate tax rebates given to the industrial 
3. Increase government revenues  by  raising  public  sector prices,  by  tax 
agricultural sector. 
sector, and redirect trade policy toward export promotion. 
reform, and by a reduction of  tax evasion. 